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ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE. By Richard 
A. Posner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1976. Pp. x, 
262. $15. 
The book jacket on Professor Richard A. Posner's Antitrust Law: 
An Economic Perspective states: "This book will challenge the 
thinking of businessmen, lawyers, economists, government officials, 
and anyone concerned with public policy toward business." The 
anonymous writers of book jacket blurbs are notorious for engaging 
in puffing well beyond what many a subsequently disappointed 
reader feels legitimate. But in this case, the statement is accurate. 
This compact, lucidly written book by one of our leading antitrust 
scholars will surely take its place as one of the major antitrust works 
of recent years, even though its primary conclusion, that all antitrust 
statutes except section 1 of the Sherman Act be repealed, is totally 
unrealistic and acknowledged by Posner to be so. But the book 
focuses discussion on a great many issues, and it contains an analysis 
of the defects of conventional thought that simply cannot be ignored, 
no matter how strongly one disagrees. It will anger some and please 
others. Ultimately, the book left me unsatisfied. 
Before explaining in some detail precisely why, I might add that 
the book was fun to read. I recognize that an academic may be 
frowned upon for making such an admission, but I think many will 
have the same reaction. I believe this is the only book in the anti-
trust field I have read from cover to cover in one sitting. The book 
is short, and that is a virtue seldom found these days. It is provoca-
tive. It is stimulating. And whatever else may be said of Posner's 
work, we must all acknowledge that unlike some in the field he 
knows how to write, although his style has a pontifical quality from 
time to time. 
Posner's articles in the antitrust field are known to a number of 
specialists, and much of this book will be familiar to them. Some 
has been said before by others. And much of it has already been 
said by him, for substantial portions of this book are simply taken 
in whole or in part from a series of articles in legal or economic jour-
nals written by Posner over the past several years.1 Yet several 
1. Portions of the book are taken from or based upon the following articles by 
Professor Posner: Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the 
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 15 
CoLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975); Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. 
em. L. REV. 506 (1974); Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 
768 
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chapters are wholly new, written in part to provid~ a cohesive, total 
overview. In this review I will simply treat the book as a whole, 
with little effort to separate what Posner has previously said from 
what he says here, leaving that detective work to others. 
The book is not an antitrust treatise but rather a critique and 
blueprint for reform, not only of the substance of antitrust but of its 
procedures and institutions as well. It will be of little assistance to 
the lawyer looking for case citations and bibliographic references. 
Indeed, if the reader wants to find what Posner does rely upon to 
support his arguments, other than the economic rationale developed 
early in the book, he must tum to the original articles from which 
part of the text is taken. While this adds to the seemingly oracular 
quality of some of his pronouncements, it is consistent with his hope 
to make the work understandable beyond the world of specialists. 
I. THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST 
Style is one aspect of the book, substance is something else. 
Innovative ideas are not always directly useful, and programs based 
on them may not work. It is at this level that I have difficulty with 
Professor Posner's book. 
The changes proposed by him are sweeping indeed, even if we 
put to one side his suggestion that all antitrust statutes except section 
1 of the Sherman Act be repealed. He starts with the proposition 
that the major concern of antitrust enforcement should be collusion 
among competing firms that has the effect of maintaining prices at 
noncompetitive levels. Collusion is broadly defined to include any 
tacit meeting of the minds, with or without direct communication. 
He believes, contrary to the views of many others, that section 1 of 
the Sherman Act can and should be utilized to reach such collusion, 
through the use of economic evidence. Indeed, he views the 
"criminalization" of rules with respect to price-fixing as antitrust's 
major doctrinal failing, placing unwarranted emphasis on conspira-
torial acts rather than economic effects and leading to a concern with 
concentration levels that is both unnecessary and costly. In his view, 
"oligopolistic" or "administered" pricing is a competitive problem 
only in the presence of "tacit collusion;" market concentration is rele-
vant only insofar as a small number of firms may find it easier to 
21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Problems of a Policy of Deconcentration, in INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 393-400 (Goldschmid, Mann & Weston 
eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION]; A Program for the 
Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500 (1971); The Social Costs of Monopoly 
and Regulation, 83 J. PoL. EcoN. 807 (1975). The interested reader may want to 
examine the following, also by Professor Posner: ANTirRUsr: CASES, EcoNOMIC 
NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS (1974); ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); Oligop-
olistic Pricing Suits, The Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1976); A Statistical Study of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 13 J. L. & EcoN. 365 (1970).· 
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collude than a large number. Since section 1 can directly reach the 
offending behavior, deconcentration need not be sought. Posner 
sees little, if any, virtue to monopolization or attempt to monopolize 
cases seeking structural relief by use of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, viewing most of these cases as direct or indirect attacks on effi-
ciency. 
Posner's proposed anti-merger policy wou1d be confined to a few 
vertical mergers and some horizontal mergers in markets where four-
firm concentration exceeds sixty per cent, or where the industry is 
predisposed to collusion. Restrictions on distribution-resale price 
maintenance and vertical territorial restraints-would be unlawful 
only if shown to be the result of a dealer cartel. Tying arrangements 
should be analyzed as a form of price discrimination and condemned 
only under very limited circumstances. Substantial revisions in the cur-
rent approach to predatory pricing, exclusive dealing arrangements, 
and group boycotts are also proposed. Finally, Posner suggests a 
wide range of administrative and procedural reforms, from abolition 
of prison sentences and substantial curtailment of the private treble 
damage remedy (with the creation of a new monetary penalty) to 
major changes in the procedures by which major antitrust actions are 
tried. 
This is, then, an ambitious undertaking, perhaps overly so. At 
places the book is too terse, the conclusions too categorically stated, 
to be thoroughly convincing. Posner utilizes a basic approach that 
is no longer novel, although in saying that I am to a degree simply 
acknowledging his own previous contribution. It is, in large part, 
the approach of the so-called Chicago school, which advocates using 
primarily the "science of economics" to rethink antitrust's substantive 
and administrative aspects. Posner's carefully selected use of the 
word "science" may suggest to some heavy reliance on empirical 
data. In fact, Posner makes little use of such data. The primary 
tool used is an economic theory of monopoly, which for him both 
defines the ultimate goal of antitrust policy and guides application 
of that policy to specific conduct. 
The single, over-all goal is simply the promotion of efficiency in 
the economic sense. Where competition is less efficient than 
monopoly, monopoly ought not be condemned. Nor would Posner 
accept the suggestion, seemingly made from time to time, 2 that con-
duct should be condemned because it makes the offending firm 
more efficient than others of its competitors. Antitrust policy should 
be directed solely toward the elimination and prevention of monop-
oly pricing, which, in Posner's words, "results when firms create an 
artificial scarcity of their product and thereby drive price above its 
level of competition."3 He rejects, for lack of empirical support, 
2. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
3. R. POSNER, .ANrlTRUST LAW: AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976). 
March 1977] Recent Books 771 
arguments that monopoly should be condemned because it dulls in-
centives to reduce costs or retards innovation, thereby putting to one 
side a basis on which monopolies are frequently faulted, 4 and rests 
instead on the direct social costs of monopoly pricing. These costs 
are, first, the reduction of output and the correlative satisfaction of 
consumer demand at a higher cost than under competition, and, 
second, the tendency of monopoly profits to , be transformed into 
further social costs as sellers attempt to gain or maintain monopoly 
positions and consumers attempt to combat it. The latter point is 
a significant one that, while not wholly new, is more fully developed 
and utilized by Posner than I have seen before. 
Measured against a single-minded concern with economic effi-
ciency, as he defines it, Posner believes much of our conventional anti-
trust analysis is wrong, and, indeed, counterproductive. In its place 
he proposes a form of analysis and body of doctrine of striking struc-
tural symmetry, and, in a sense, of stark simplicity. It brings to mind 
some great cathedral, with all its stone, all its bits of glass, in the 
right place, all designed to serve one purpose. But those awed by 
such structures commonly are struck by the air of unreality about 
them. They are too symmetrical, too perfect. While they are a 
great human achievement, they do not seem to speak to the world 
in which most of us live and work. They often stand in stark con-
trast to what surrounds them. I have something of the same reaction 
to Posner's analysis. Even assuming the almost mathematical cor-
rectness of his rigorous economic analysis, is the structure simply out 
of social context? And, since the analysis rests on behavior of mar-
kets, firms, and ultimately, people, do they behave as Posner be-
lieves, or in some other way? Have we reached the point where 
economic theory must give way to the study of industrial and organ-
izational psychology? Is it realistic to believe the reforms he sug-
gests can be accomplished? These are the first questions raised by 
this book. 
That the goal of antitrust should be elimination of the misalloca-
tion of resources resulting from economic inefficiency is not a 
startlingly new proposition, although it is hardly universally accepted. 
Indeed, were it so accepted, Posner's severe attack on a number of 
Supreme Court decisions inconsistent with this goal would be 
unnecessary, and, I suspect, this book would never have seen the 
light of day. There is, of course, little disagreement over the propo-
sition that the misallocation of resources resulting from economic in-
efficiency is a goal of antitrust. The crucial debate is whether there 
4. The classic statement is that made by. Judge Learned Hand in United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). The empirical 
studies with respect to the relationship between concentration and innovation are 
discussed in Markham, Concentration: A Stimulus or Retardant to Innovation, in 
INDUSTIUAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 1, at 247. 
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are others as well, 5 and Posner, along with a number of his col-
leagues, has played a major role in it. This book will further sharpen 
the discussion, although it is not primarily directed toward the 
choice of goals but is instead an analysis based on the starting as-
sumption that there is no other proper antitrust policy. 
Whether Posner's attack on current antitrust policy and court 
decisions, and his proposals for reform, are right or wrong for the 
most part depends on the validity of his central thesis. I will not 
here attempt to set forth my views which, while in some substantial 
agreement with those of Posner, would take too many pages to ex-
plain. But I will deal briefly with several aspects of Posner's 
analysis that trouble me. 
The critical question of goals is one of choices. If economic effi-
ciency is the sole goal of antitrust, other goals are rejected to the 
extent they are either inconsistent with or not satisfied by it. Those 
who reject Posner's single standard advocate others, some of which 
have been accepted on occasion by the courts. These range from 
a concern over the political and social power exercised by large firms, 
jointly or individually, to a belief that monopoly is an evil because 
it is a means of wealth transfer from "poor" consumers to "wealthy" 
shareholders. Most common, of course, is the concept that antitrust 
should be utilized to protect or promote small business, both by 
handicapping large firms and by creating (artificially, perhaps) an 
equality between large and small firms in their dealings with each 
other and third parties. Robert Bork, in his detailed analysis written 
a number of years ago, categorized judicial decisions varying from 
the economic efficiency criteria as "the deviant theme."0 One 
could easily conclude from Posner's severe criticism, and from 
the fact he finds little in them to applaud, that these decisions are 
in fact the dominant strain-that when truly required to resolve a 
policy conflict, the courts have frequently chosen some value other 
than efficiency. In fact, the courts have tended to base decisions 
judging the legality of horizontal restraints on economic efficiency 
grounds and have applied other criteria primarily, although not ex-
clusively, in cases involving vertical restraints. 7 Most often these 
decisions have placed heavy emphasis on the protection of small 
business through the preservation of business opportunity and 
equality, although there are some decisions that emphasize the 
5. See, e.g., Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 555 (1973); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fix-
ing and Market Division I, II, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); 
Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra 
note 1, at 1; The Goals of Alllitrust: A Dialogue 011 Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 
(1965); Liebeler, Toward a Consumer's Antitrust Law: The Federal Trade Commis-
sion and Vertical Mergers in the Cement Industry, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1153 (1968). 
6. Bork, 74 YALE L.J. 775, supra note 5, at 781-82, 811. 
7. See Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of EconomicJ, 
Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 333 (1968). 
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political and social power of the firms in question. 8 
Posner spends little time explaining why he rejects these values 
as legitimate concerns of antitrust, largely, I suspect, because he and 
others have been over this ground before. But the arguments he 
does advance are not altogether convincing, not so much because 
they are wrong, as because they do not fully meet the arguments 
advanced on the other side. 
For example, he offers his restatement of the argument for an 
antitrust policy based on political power: "[M]onopoly, or more 
broadly any condition (such as concentration) that fosters coopera-
tion among competing firms, will facilitate an industry's manipulation 
of the political process to obtain protective legislation aimed at in-
creasing the industry's profits."9 He then dismisses the argument, 
having reduced it to nothing more than "concentration facilitates 
monopoly pricing indirectly through the legislative process,"10 as 
adding nothing to an antitrust policy based solely on criteria of eco-
nomic efficiency. This is a legitimate response to the political power 
argument as Posner has articulated it. But proponents of the politi-
cal power approach would not aQcept Posner's restatement of their 
position. Perhaps the logical argument should be that political 
power will lead to monopoly pricing. We have seen numerous 
examples of this in some of our regulated industries. But the more 
common fear is of unbridled political power that may be utilized for 
a variety of purposes, ranging from fiscal policy to social welfare pro-
grams, and in a variety of ways, from outright bribery to effective 
control of regulatory agencies. Not surprisingly, those who seek the 
use of the antitrust laws as one means of controlling such activity 
come very close to attacking corporate size alone. To be sure, the 
ultimate goal of some corporate political activity is enhanced profit 
levels through ~onopoly pricing, but much of it is not. Such activity 
may in fact have more to do with the personal political convictions 
of those in top management, who desire to remain at the top eco-
nomic class levels, than those of the corporation itself. Posner does 
not really answer this type of argument, although there are a number 
of ways of doing so, at least in terms of logic. The literal language 
of the antitrust statutes focuses on competition, and this alone sug-
gests the inappropriateness of the political power approach. More-
over, unless we are prepared to use the antitrust laws to attack size 
alone, that approach furnishes no specific principles to guide 
decisionmaking. Nor is it clear why corporate political power is to 
be singled out for such treatment. Other groups, including labor 
unions, may be equally powerful, if not more so. Finally, if antitrust 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 274-77 (1966); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
9. R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 18. 
10. Id. at 19. 
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is to be measured against corporate political power, it has not been 
a singular success. 
The major argument against exclusive reliance on economic effi-
ciency criteria, and the one that appears to gain acceptance over and 
over again in judicial decisions, is that antitrust must play a role in 
the preservation and promotion of small business, or individual op-
portunity. Posner responds, in part, with the observation that small 
business as suoh generally benefits from monopoly, which, by creat-
ing a spread between costs (including a fair capital return) and 
prices, permits smaller firms with higher costs to survive under the 
umbrella monopoly pricing creates. This is, in essence, an argument 
that even those decisions that are openly protectionist in their 
rationale do not really achieve the results they seek. To a substantial 
degree Posner is right, although he carries the argument too far when 
he asserts that the best antitrust policy for small business is no anti-
trust policy. 
To the extent small businesses fear single firm or cartel pricing 
as such, it is in their role as purchasers. As purchasers, small busi-
nesses are like any other buyers and are adequately protected by 
an antitrust policy based upon Posner's proposed criteria alone. As 
competitors, my own experience suggests small firms do recognize 
that they stand to gain if the dominant firms engage in monopoly 
pricing and may be understandably reluctant to invoke or have 
someone else invoke antitrust sanctions against the major firms, which 
may bring prices more in line with costs of these firms. And, consist-
ent with this recognition of their own interests, small firms commonly 
do object to mergers involving competitors that they perceive will 
lower the merged firm's costs, precisely on that ground. In short, 
small business has no unique concern with monopoly pricing and 
in their own industry may prefer it, as Posner suggests. 
But his contention has little to do with two concerns commonly 
expressed by the small business community and those who reflect 
similar views. While many firms would undoubtedly be delighted 
with monopoly price levels in their markets, they want protection 
against acts of major firms that might lead to that monopoly pricing 
and make them victims along the way. It is in the area of exclusionary 
practices that smaller firms most commonly seek, and obtain, anti-
trust protection. Second, there are a number of businesses, small and 
large, controlled by persons who value freedom of action, perhaps 
wholly without regard to economic consequence, and who view the 
antitrust laws as the means of keeping themselves free of "undue" re-
strictions that might otherwise be placed upon them by sellers or 
licensors.11 Concern with exclusionary practices that would in fact 
lead to monopoly pricing is to a substantial de~ee consistent with 
11. They might, of course, be equally concerned about the restraints placed upon 
them by the antitrust laws themselves. 
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Posner's economic efficiency argument, as he makes clear in a signifi-
cant chapter of this book. To the extent the two goals are consistent, 
no special recognition of the "rights" of smaller firms is needed. But 
I am sure the differences are significant, for there will be argument 
over what is in fact exclusionary even under the economic efficiency 
standard, and many will assert that antitrust should prohibit certain 
forms of conduct without regard to its role in monopoly pricing. The 
latter argument is either a rejection of the economic efficiency argu-
ment or a reflection of a belief that, if the economic case can be made 
against a particular type of conduct ( such as tying arrangements) in 
some situations, the law should flatly prohibit it, to avoid the undue 
complexity and costs associated with a broader inquiry. 
Posner recognizes that critics of his economic efficiency approach 
will find unconvincing his proposition that smaller businesses would 
be better off without antitrust policy, and he proceeds to make his 
ultimate policy choice clear. If one has to choose between economic 
efficiency and the protection of small business or the preservation 
of large numbers of competitors, efficiency must be the choice. To 
protect small business at the expense of efficiency is ultimately self-
defeating, since this will increase costs and force the efficiency-
seeking firm to make choices that will be even more damaging to 
the small firm. I am not convinced that this is universally true, al-
though its likelihood is considerable. 
I do not mean to belabor these points. Clearly Posner's views 
will not be accepted by everyone, and he knows that. I have raised 
these questions because they reflect the uneasiness many of us feel 
with the economic efficiency criteria as the sole guide to antitrust 
policy. Perhaps that uneasiness rests in. the fact that we have been 
led to these criteria less by philosophical commitment than by a prag-
matic concern over the law's inability to quantify social and political 
concerns and thus make them workable guidelines, and in response 
to what have seemed particularly muddled judicial pronouncements. 
The apparent simplicity of the efficiency concept is appealing and 
is a way to avoid making difficult, if not impossible, value choices. 
But I think the uneasiness is far more the result of two other factors. 
We are not totally convinced that the economic efficiency criteria, 
at least as developed so far, are themselves really workable or, per-
haps more importantly, totally in tune with how people and markets 
really behave. 
In large part, this is more a concern with the implementation of 
an antitrust policy directed solely toward the economic efficiency goal 
than with the goal itself, although not entirely so. We are also un-
easy because the courts, the Congress, and the enforcement agencies 
have long emphasized other goals, and, perhaps, because the lawyer 
in us rebels at putting such traditions to one side without being totally 
sure that they are now irrelevant. 
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Posner does not examine, in historical terms, how some of these 
"deviant" strains have worked their way into antitrust analysis and 
have retained their vitality. The only reference to the intention of 
Congress is the statement that "the dominant legislative intent has 
been to promote some approximation of the economist's idea of com-
petition."12 In a sense, an historical examination is beyond the scope 
of this highly conceptual analysis, but its absence leaves the reader 
both uneasy in accepting Posner's central thesis and unwilling to be-
lieve that much of the reform he proposes can be achieved. 
One cannot simply assume that Supreme Court justices are 
persistently misguided, ignorant, or malevolent, although some por-
tions of this book might create that impression. Indeed, the very 
severity of the criticism on occasion reduces its effectiveness. But 
it surely is true that the Court has, at least in some areas, been 
totally unable to reconcile conflicting goals and produce a completely 
rational body of law. Nowhere is that as clear as in the Court's 
struggles in recent years to deal with vertical territorial restraints and 
resale price maintenance. The artificial distinctions drawn by the 
Court between agreements and unilateral refusals to deal, sales and 
agency, and "coerced" conduct and free choice, and its condemna-
tion of vertical territorial restraints as per se violations in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.13 after it declined to adopt such a 
rule only four years earlier in White Motor Co. v. United States,14 
can at best be described as confused. Posner and others, including 
myself, have criticized the rationale of these decisions.16 But why 
have these legalistic doctrines and inconsistent value judgments per-
sisted? Similarly, the analysis of the tying arrangement as a form 
of price discrimination has become virtually conventional.1° It is re-
peated by Posner, who, unlike a number of others, then goes on to 
consider whether and when tie-ins should be treated as unlawful dis-
crimination. But he also correctly observes that this whole body of 
literature "has virtually no impact on public policy."17 I made a 
similar statement eight years ago, noting that the Supreme Court has 
"virtually ignored" the growing body of economic knowledge about 
vertical restraints.18 The Court's refusal to change its approach to 
tying arrangements is explained, Posner claims, by the persistence 
12. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 20. 
13. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
14. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
15. See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 7, at 340-41. 
16. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE 
L.J. 19, (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV, 62 
(1960); Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 
1397 (1967); Stigler, United States v. Lowe's, Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 
SuP. Cr. REv. 152. 
17. R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 174. 
18. Kauper, supra note 7, at 331. 
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of the view that tie-ins are exclusionary and raise barriers to entry, 
effects he seeks to disprove in economic terms. But this is not 
wholly satisfactory, for ultimately the exclusion or "foreclosure" con-
cept does not appear to be rooted in economics at all.19 
This is the basic dilemma. If the courts have persistently simply 
misapplied the "science" of economics in an honest, albeit mis-
guided, effort to satisfy an economic efficiency criteria, their "error" 
may result from nothing more than the unavailability through much of 
our history of the economic tools that now can be utilized. While 
this may suggest that severe criticism of these decisions on the basis 
of economic knowledge not contemporaneously available is unwar-
ranted, it also means that reform should be relatively easy. Yet the 
values reflected in a number of these decisions are not values predi-
cated on economic efficiency but are drawn from other sources. I 
suggested at one point that the Warren Court's emphasis on unre-
strained, independent decisionmaking and equal opportunity, which 
seemed to me to be the themes underlying a number of vertical 
restraint decisions, was derived from the same concepts rooted deep 
in our history, upon which a number of its civil rights and criminal 
cases were predicated, 20 but that explanation is not wholly satisfac-
tory either. Nor is it sufficient to dismiss these decisions as undue 
obeisance to stare decisis. 
Perhaps we ought not be concerned with explanations of past 
decisions and policies. Posner's goal is to put forward a systematic, 
rational antitrust program based upon economic criteria and analysis, 
and this requires no historical exegesis. But without a full understand-
ing of the undercurrents of the past, we have little way of evaluat-
ing the extent to which they presently exist and, therefore, the extent 
to which reform is possible. Posner at several points suggests 
that his proposed reforms are "impractical," or "academic," or 
"unrealistic." The reason, I would suppose, is not because he has 
doubts about the merits of his proposals. It is because others 
have doubts, and thus change within the political system may not be 
possible. In short, it seems to me that the most likely explanation 
for the continued emphasis on the protectionist approach to antitrust 
is the obvious one, namely, that as a people we continue to believe 
that the antitrust laws are intended to protect small business and in-
dividual opportunity and to preserve a variety of social and political 
values. This may at any given moment reflect a general antibusiness 
attitude, a nostalgic desire to return to the days when local business-
men were truly local, or a simple fear of power. 21 If this is so, 
19. Id. at 332. 
20. Id. at 334. 
21. Professor Donald Dewey, speaking as an economist, has asserted that econo-
mists' attachment to antitrust results because "[w]e are made uneasy and suspicious 
by great corporate size in the private sector of the economy for the same reason as 
our fellow citizens. We react in this way because we believe that great corporate 
size concentrates discretionary authority in the hands of too few people." Dewey, 
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reform along the lines suggested by Posner may be impossible to 
achieve, even if it is desirable, at least in the absence of some other 
means of meeting these concerns. 
Posner recognizes that staututory reform necessary to imple-
ment his proposed body of doctrine is most likely not achievable, and 
thus he chooses to emphasize that most of the changes he proposes can 
be carried out by judicial interpretation, the basic doctrines having 
been judicially created in the first instance. This sharp line between 
judicial and legislative action is unrealistic. Judicial decisions are not 
composed in a vacuum. Judges share the values of the society from 
which they are drawn. If the public is unprepared to accept an anti-
trust policy predicated solely on economic efficiency, and to see im-
plementation of that policy through legislative change, how likely is 
it that the courts will do so? Moreover, courts do not simply pro-
nounce. They are confined to cases put before them and often 
make decisions based primarily on the record and contentions of the 
parties. In private antitrust cases, these contentions are likely to be 
directed solely to private interests. While in a few cases this may 
lead to more imaginative and creative decisionmaking, such cases are 
more likely to sidetrack any rational, systematic approach to anti-
trust enforcement. Judgments about government enforcement ac-
tions can be made on a more systematic basis, but these decisions 
also are made within. a political system and are thus affected by 
a variety of societal concerns manifested in a variety of ways-
through presidential involvement, congressional oversight, and the 
appropriations process. These "input" processes, which are of some 
consequence, are not fully understood and warrant further attention. 
And even apart from the specific influence of a variety of others, 
the enforcement agencies are not totally free to disregard the law 
as it has been interpreted. Posner has argued elsewhere that by vir-
tue of making judgments concerning the best utilization of scarce re-
sources, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division could substanti-
ally implement a policy based solely on economic efficiency, declin-
ing to bring certain kinds of cases that did not meet that criterion 
even where the violation under the law as interpreted was clear, on 
the ground that scarce enforcement resources could be better utilized 
elsewhere.22 To a substantial degree Posner is right, but in practical 
The New Learning: One Man's View, in lNDUSIRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 1, 
at 10-11. At a later point, he explains this concern as follows: 
It is that many of us fear that, at some time in our lives, we may find our-
selves opposing its owners and managers in an unequal contest. No doubt there 
are also other reasons for distrusting great corporate size and concentration. 
Some, I suspect, are so deeply buried in our subconscious that they could be 
revealed only by a psychiatrist with an MBA degree. 
Id. at 13. Compare this statement with that of Judge Learned Hand, who describes 
one of the purposes of the Sherman Act as "a desire to put an end to great aggrega-
tions of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them." United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,428 (2d Cir. 1945). 
22. Posner, 38 U. CHI. L REv. 500, supra note 1, at 502-06, 
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terms his argument is overstated. The ability of the agencies to 
shape antitrust policy poses a whole series of questions that I hope at 
some time to address in more detail. For present purposes, I suggest 
only that they are not, and cannot be, quite as freewheeling as 
Posner seems to suggest. 
II. TACIT COLLUSION AND THE "OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM" 
Whether the reforms Posner proposes will be adopted, either by 
the courts or through political processes, is not the major concern 
of his book. Were it so, the tone would be more one of compromise. 
Instead, his message is that such reforms should take place and that 
antitrust policy is already too much the result of compromise. Those 
who reject his basic premise will reject many of his proposals, al-
though his analysis is also a means of evaluating the economic costs 
of using the antitrust laws for other ends. But even if the basic prem-
ise is accepted, are Posner's proposals sound? And, assuming that his 
economic conclusions are sound, can they be translated into workable 
rules than can both guide industry practice and afford a rational basis 
for decisionmaking by our enforcement agencies and courts? I 
seriously doubt that they can. 
The wide range of substantive reforms proposed by Posner has 
been alluded to earlier. Each is predicated on the economic effi-
ciency criteria, and each will become the focus of intense discussion 
among economists and other specialists for some time to come. As 
a noneconomist, I found the economic analysis clearly set forth in un-
derstandable terms and the logic frequently compelling. There are, 
however, wide divergences of view among economists over issues 
central to the analysis, and no one should assume by virtue of his 
style and consistency that Posner's views are the gospel, even in 
purely economic terms. To pick but one example, and, I believe, 
a relatively critical one, Posner minimizes, if he does not totally re-
ject, concern over barriers to entry. This leads him to the view that 
entry into new markets by firms capable of efficient production 
is relatively easy, in the sense that entry can be made on cost terms 
substantially equal to those of existing firms, with the resulting ero-
sion of monopoly pricing levels. Equally important, he gives little 
credence to arguments that some types of conduct should be con-
demned because they raise barriers to entry. There is surely general 
agreement that economies of scale in most instances ought not be 
viewed as entry barriers, but there is considerable disagreement con-
cerning the effect of capital costs and advertising expenditures. Pos-
ner obviously believes that capital markets work freely and effec-
tively, providing capital whenever the costs and risks justify it. This 
is not self-evident. 23 He contends that advertising is seldom, if ever, 
23. See F.M. SCHERER, !NDUSTIUAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 102-03 (1970). 
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a true barrier to entry because advertising expenditures by those in 
the industry raise their costs and permit others to enter without 
advertising at lower cost. Again, some disagree. 24 
All of this suggests that within the overall goal of economic effi-
ciency, there is considerable room for disagreement about the 
economic perspective and analysis as Posner develops it. He recog-
nizes this from the outset, and this discussion so far is not to be taken 
as criticism. But it does raise, in general, the question of building 
a new antitrust structure on a theoretical economic base over which 
there is considerable disagreement. Posner himself has argued else-
where that "[t]he least unsatisfactory solution . . . is for the anti-
trust chief (with the help of economist advisers) to identify those 
questions on which there is a consensus of professional opinion-
and to build his policy on that common ground. "26 
This is the key to Posner's approach, for it permits development 
of an efficiency-oriented policy in the face of argument and dispute 
among those to whom policymakers must turn for guidance. It is, 
however, a debatable proposition. There comes a point where pub-
lic agencies, and indeed all of us, must make decisions on less than 
perfect knowledge, acting instead on the belief that, consensus or not, 
someone is right. This is so because we recognize that inaction may 
be so costly that we must take a chance. That is perhaps where 
we now find ourselves in terms of the economics of antitrust. 
Posner's "consensus" approach calls for a conservative antitrust 
enforcement program and supports many of the proposals made in 
this book. Most of his reforms are aimed at narrowing the range 
of antitrust policy, particularly in areas where there is a wide range 
of views among economists. But taking Posner's consensus approach 
at face value, what of his own affirmative p!"oposals? Are they 
widely enough accepted to form a basis for reshaping antitrust 
policy? More specifically, what of his proposals for dealing with 
"tacit collusion"? 
Since Posner believes that collusion among competing firms that 
results in monopoly pricing is, or should be,. the major concern of 
antitrust policy, the major part of his analysis is devoted to the prob-
lem of collusion. His central theme, simply put, is that the law and 
its enforcement agencies have not gone far enough in attacking and 
condemning tacit collusion-coordination of pricing without any 
overt or detectable acts of communication-on the basis of economic 
evidence, and that this in turn has caused a distortion in the law's 
treatment of mergers, information-exchange agreements, resale price 
24. See, e.g., Comanor & Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure and Perform-
ance, 49 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 423 (1967); Mann, Advertising, Concentration, and 
Profitability: The State of Knowledge and Directions for Public Policy, in INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 1, at 137. 
25. Posner, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500, supra n~te 1, at 507. 
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maintenance, and vertical territorial arrangements. Unable to deal 
with supracompetitive pricing levels in highly concentrated in-
dustries in behavioral terms, the law has been shaped with an 
emphasis on structure unacceptable to Posner. His thesis, developed 
more fully elsewhere, 26 is that contrary to much popular learning, 
such pricing results, if at all, not as the inevitable consequence of 
structure but through tacit collusion that may be attacked under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. 27 And the remedy, in his view, should 
be directed toward behavior, not structure. 
This central theme is at the heart of much of Posner's analysis 
and criticism of current policy. It is the underpinning for his attack 
on structural relief. He sharply attacks the historical treatment of 
price-fixing, which is predicated on proof of truly conspiratorial con-
duct directed toward actual agreement among competitors and applies 
criminal sanctions where such conduct is found. The "criminalization" 
of the price-fixing rule has, in his judgment, led to two unfortunate 
consequences. First, by leading to a search for overt conspiratorial 
acts, it has led the law away from the economic approach he now 
proposes and is thus part of the historical explanation for the belief 
that such acts are a prerequisite for successful prosecution. Second, 
the criminal rule, with its emphasis on such acts, has led the courts 
and agencies to ignore actual effects, resulting in the prosecution of 
mere attempts. But the implications of Posner's "tacit collusion" ar-
gument also carry over into his analysis of other behavior. Mergers 
ought to be condemned only if they facilitate collusion. Posner 
would apparently go a step further and conclude that even then we 
do not need to prohibit the merger but can separately deal with any 
"tacit collusion" that results. He does not press the point, however, 
and suggests instead a merger policy predicated wholly on his con-
cern over collusion. 
At the heart of this collusion analysis, then, are two arguments. 
First, highly concentrated market structure does not inevitably lead 
to monopoly pricing. To be sure, high concentration facilitates col-
lusion, because the fewer the number of sellers the easier it is both 
to organize and subsequently police a collusive arrangement. But 
structure itself is not determinative. Those advocating structural re-
lief view high concentration as a measure of firm market power; Pos-
ner views it only as showing use of collusion. The additional 
elements needed to assure monopoly pricing are discretionary acts 
that can be directly prohibited. Second, Posner believes that section 
1, in conjunction with economic evidence, can reach all or virtually 
26. See Posner, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, supra note 1; Posner, 38 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 500, supra note 1; Posner, 28 STAN. L. REv. 903, supra note 1. 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). Section 1 is applicable to conduct that can 
be described as a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy." Unlike § 2, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (Supp. V 1975), which makes it an offense to "monopolize or attempt to mo-
nopolize," § 1 is not applicable to purely unilateral conduct. 
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all undesirable, persistent mo~opoly pricing in concentrated indus-
tries, thus obviating any further need to look to structure alone. Mo-
nopoly pricing results from behavior the law can prohibit as such-
that is, monopoly pricing previously explained as "interdependent" 
pricing can be attacked under section I-through the use of eco-
nomic proof. If Posner's analysis is to be taken as far as he 
suggests, both points are crucial, for if monopoly pricing can result 
without "tacit collusion," or if section 1 cannot theoretically or prac-
tically reach all such collusion, a remedial gap remains. This would 
not mean that Posner's approach to tacit collusion lacks utility but 
simply that it is not the complete answer to the "oligopoly" problem. 
The economic argument calling for deconcentration would not be 
completely satisfied, although it must be recognized that there are 
a number of practical cost and efficiency loss arguments against a 
deconcentration program as well, arguments that Posner makes very 
strongly. And his proposed shift in merger rules would also lose 
much of its analytic support. 
Professor Posner'r, "tacit collusion" analysis starts with a firm re-
jection of the interdependent pricing concept and of much of the now-
historic analysis of behavior in highly concentrated industries. While 
the economists will argue over much of what he says on these points, 
I did not find his reasoning altogether convincing. 
Posner attacks the "structural" thinking on oligopolistic pricing 
on both the empirical and theoretical levels. He has been an active 
participant in the current debate over the correlation between high 
industry concentration and high profit levels, and he views the evi-
dence as ambiguous at best. 28 Ambiguity does not of course mean 
no correlation exists. It may simply mean some studies were badly 
designed, improperly interpreted, or insufficiently sophisticated. 
Consistent with the method he commonly employs, however, Posner 
concludes that, since there is dispute over this evidence, a public 
policy directed against high levels of concentration cannot be predi-
cated upon it. But it does not seem to me that he adequately deals 
with all of the empirical data suggesting that highly concentrated in-
dustries ·do at least behave differently with respect to price and out-
put than those with more firms. Indeed, he does not discuss this 
evidence at all. In fairness, Posner apparently felt that this volume 
was not the appropriate place to debate such evidence, and that the 
interested reader could find that discussion elsewhere. But his 
28. The empirical evidence relating to the economic consequences of high con-
centration is discussed in great detail in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 1, 
to which Posner refers his readers. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 79 n.2. I am 
more inclined to the view stated by Professor Leonard Weiss that on balance the 
evidence still reflects the relationship. Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relation-
ship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 1, at 184. But that 
does not explain why this is so, and it is primarily in the explanation of behavior that 
Posner differs from others. 
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rather cavalier treatment of empirical data that, after all, is at the 
core of the very contention he is seeking to counter, is unsatisfying. 
Having put to one side the empirical evidence, Posner attacks 
the conceptual underpinning of the structural analysis, the theory of 
"interdependent" pricing, particularly as that theory has been es-
poused by Professor Donald Turner. 29 That theory rests on the 
proposition that, where there are few sellers, each must take into 
account the impact of its pricing decisions on its rivals. The result 
may be that monopoly pricing levels are attained through rational, 
unilateral decisionmaking by each firm. Because the decision is 
dependent upon each firm's evaluation of its rivals' reactions, pricing 
is described as "interdependent." And because the decisions are, 
in fact, both unilateral and economically rational as unilateral judg-
ments, section 1 should not be used to attack such pricing, even 
though the effect may be the same as overt collusion. It would make 
no sense to punish such conduct, for we cannot require that firms 
not consider rivals' reactions. The problem is the result of structure, 
and only changes in structure will solve it. 
Posner attacks this analysis by pointing out situations where a 
seller may lower prices and increase output because he can conceal 
his decisions, or because it will take time for rivals to expand output. 
The seller may rely on a time lag in response. Rivals may not 
respond if the new price simply attracts new buyers, or if they lack 
additional plant capacity. He is similarly critical of the analysis as 
a general explanation for the reluctance to reduce prices. Substantial 
parts of his analysis would not provoke argument, even, I suspect, 
from Professor Turner. For the most part, Posner does not deny 
that, where there are few sellers, each will consider what its rivals 
will do. In doing so, however, it may become clear to such a seller 
that there are price and output "decisions that could be made without 
immediate concern over the rivals' response. 
What is the result of Posner's analysis? Despite his unwilling-
ness to accept empirical data suggesting that monopoly pricing has 
some direct correlation to high degrees of concentration, he has not 
demonstrated the negative. Indeed, there is no need that he do so, 
since his own analysis suggests that monopoly pricing is more 
common in highly concentrated industries than in fragmented ones. 
As he points out repeatedly, a small number of sellers can collude, 
whether overtly or in some other way, far more easily than can a 
large number. Nor does he show that monopoly pricing does not 
result from precisely the pattern of interdependent decisionmaking 
set forth by Turner, and I do not believe he intends to do so. The 
insight he offers is a simple one, namely, that any given firm may 
choose not to price at noncompetitive levels, whether. the industry 
29. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). 
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is highly concentrated or not. It is the fact of choice that is critical. 
Because a seller does have a choice, his decision to restrict output 
and increase price is a voluntary act that can provide the basis for 
finding "agreement" and thus invoking section 1. And the same fact 
of choice underlies Posner's contention that structural relief is 
unnecessary, for if noncompetitive pricing is simply a choice among 
alternatives, the law, through proper application of economic incen-
tives, can induce ( or compel) a seller to opt for the competitive alter-
native. 
Posner's purpose is clear. It is to demonstrate that structural 
relief is both unnecessary and inappropriate as a remedy for 
monopoly pricing in highly concentrated industries. But it is a long 
jump from his pricing analysis to this ultimate conclusion. While the 
analysis has a virtually mathematical precision, I cannot make all the 
necessary steps, in either conceptual or practical terms, with the same 
ease as Posner. And I cannot imagine a truly dramatic shift in anti-
trust policy predicated upon it. 
At the outset, many readers may have difficulty in determining 
whether Posner's concept of "tacit collusion" is broad enough to 
cover all conduct resulting in noncompetitive price and output levels. 
Posner is not as clear on this point in this book as he might be. 
There is a semantic difficulty with the phrase that invariably causes 
confusion, for to some it is likely to suggest a process of collusively 
arriving at collective decisions without direct communication but 
through acts that are intended to and do operate as forms of communi-
cation nevertheless, such as public signals and invitations. The use 
of section 1 to attack such conduct, which involves something more 
than interdependence, would hardly be a new idea. But although 
the reader may think that this is what Posner is suggesting at several 
points, it seems clear that his concept of "tacit collusion" is not so 
confined. Indeed, in the article from which much of the current 
book is taken, "tacit collusion" is simply described as "non-competi-
tive pricing by oligopolists."30 And proof of a section 1 case is 
simply proof that such pricing has occurred. 
The formulation thus is simple and all-inclusive. The concern 
with oligopoly is monopoly pricing. Monopoly pricing results from 
collusion, overt or tacit.31 In either event, collusion can be remedied 
through section 1. Neither those who do not accept Posner's eco-
nomic criteria as a measure of antitrust policy nor those who believe 
oligopoly tends to retard innovation or slow the drive to reduce costs 
30. Posner, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, supra note 1, at 1575. 
31. Posner has recognized that a higher than competitive price level established 
by a given firm can result from some degree of monopoly power held by the indi-
'Vidual firm, though he views this simply as an issue going to evaluation of the 
economic evidence offered to prove tacit collusion. But the result may be to make 
his evidentiary tests virtually unworkable. See notes 46-47 infra and accompanying 
text. 
March 1977) Recent Books 785 
will be satisfied. But even in its own terms, the analysis raises more 
questions than it answers. 
Initially, how does Posner's analysis truly differ 'from that of 
the structuralists? If monopoly pricing is the concern, and interde-
pendent judgments leading to such pricing are "collusion," the 
primary differences with the interdependent pricing theory he at-
tacks are first, that under Posner's analysis the conduct is treated as 
an agreement foi- Sherman Act purposes; second, the proof at trial, 
being somewhat differently focused, may be somewhat dissimilar; and 
third, the remedy would be behavioral, not structural. The first of 
these differences is of course critical in legal terms, and it is certainly 
less than clear that courts are prepared to accept such a broad defini-
tion of "agreement." Posner asserts that such an interpretation is con-
sistent with prior Supreme Court decisions in American Tobacco Co. 
v. United States>2 and Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,33 but 
whether or not "consistent," it is clear that those cases do not go as 
far as Posner does. 3 -1 And while the courts might conclude that 
"tacit collusion," as Posner defines it, is simply an after-the-fact label 
to be applied to conduct that does not in fact reflect collusion at all, 
rejecting the concept out of hand, on its face the language of the 
statute could encompass such conduct.35 I do not mean here to 
debate the point. I would simply note that the courts have not gone 
this far, and there is no assurance they ever will. To predicate 
significant shifts in antitrust policy on the basis that the interpretation 
might be upheld would be premature, to say the least. 
Posner addresses the issue of proof in some detail, both here and 
elsewhere, 36 arguing strenuously that tacit collusion can, and should, 
be proved by reliance on economic evidence, in some cases by such 
evidence alone. The validity and workability of this aspect of the 
proposal is discussed in detail below. But it is important to recog-
nize at the outset what Posner believes is to be proved. What is 
not to be proved is that the firms in a given industry in fact commu-
nicated directly, but in a way that left no traces, although Posner con-
cedes this may well occur in a great many cases. The inquiry is 
simply whether the firms engaged in noncompetitive pricing and out-
32. 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
33. 306 U.S. 308 (1939). 
34. Posner has recognized this fact. See Posner, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, supra 
note 1, at 1577. The referenced discussion does not include American Tobacco, and 
on its face at least the case in the Supreme Court involved only § 2 of the Sherman 
Act and encompassed conduct beyond price and output decisions. Nevertheless, 
American Tobacco does come closer to Posner's analysis than any other decision of 
the Supreme Court. 
35. Compare Turner, supra note 29, at 665, 671, with Markovits, Oligopolistic 
Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Response to Professor 
Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 933-35 (1976). 
36. See sources cited in note 26 supra. 
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put restriction; if this is shown, cartel theory takes care of the rest. 37 
Viewed in this light, does the economic evidence upon which Posner 
would rely vary significantly from that which would be necessary in 
a proceeding under section 2 of the Sherman Act, brought either on 
an attempt or shared monopoly basis, to obtain divestiture relief? 
Unless the courts in section 2 cases are prepared to rely upon struc-
ture alone, and there is little to suggest that they are, proof of some 
noncompetitive behavior would be critical in such cases as well. 38 A 
key element of such proof would surely be price and output 
behavior, and since any section 2 case would rest on some showing 
of market power, proof of monopoly pricing would at least be rele-
vant on that question. This is not to suggest that the proof Posner 
would utilize in a section 1 case is identical to that likely to be the 
basis of a section 2 action. In a section 2 case far more weight would 
be placed on market structure and so-called exclusionary conduct. ao 
But the point is that there would be considerable overlap. 
The most basic practical difference, then, between those who 
would seek to deal with "the oligopoly problem" through section 2 
and Posner, other than legal interpretation, relates to remedy. 
Posner approaches remedy by asking whether noncompetitive be-
havior not resulting from overt collusion can be redirected by the 
legal system. Some oligopolists do not restrict output, for a variety 
of reasons. If this is so, others can be compelled to act in the same 
way. Those who would seek structural relief, on the other hand, 
view such attempts to change rational, noncompetitive behavior as 
an exercise in futility. 
At the core of Posner's analysis is the use of economic evidence, 
both to plan the efficient allocation of enforcement resources and 
as proof of "tacit collusion" at trial. Initially, economic data would 
be utilized to identify industries prone to collusion, and as a means 
of evaluating ambiguous conduct, such as information exchange 
agreements. Posner would use a variety of data to conclude that 
an industry is collusion-prone, including such factors as high concen-
tration with no fringe of small sellers, slow entry, standardized 
product, and a poor industry antitrust record. Insofar as these 
factors are utilized to target and initiate investigations, without falling 
back on the "mail bag" approach sometimes used in the past, the 
resource allocation process can be significantly improved, even if the 
law's primary concern is overt conspiratorial behavior. In recent 
years, the Antitrust Division has relied on a number of these factors 
37. But see the caveat discussed in note 31 supra and in notes 46 & 47 infra. 
38. See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 
82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1225-31 (1969). This is not to suggest that price and output 
behavior need be the focus. The more common § 2 approach should focus on 
exclusionary conduct. 
39. See id. at 1225-31. 
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for precisely these purposes. 40 Posner's first stage is to some degree 
a reality, although the analysis is not, I am sure, as precise as Posner 
believes possible. 
Far more debatable is Posner's second stage, the use of economic 
evidence at trial to prove noncompetitiv:e pricing, or "tacit collusion." 
Posner would permit a finding of collusion based on such evidence 
alone, but only in industries adjudged "collusion-prone" on the basis 
of the factors discussed above. In other cases, corroboration in the 
form of evidence of some direct communication would be necessary. 
The economic evidence on which a finding of "tacit" collusion could 
be based includes fixed market shares, price information exchanges, re-
gional price variations, and identical bids. If some or all of these 
tests, twelve in all, are satisfied, a court could find that price and 
output decisions do not reflect competitive behavior and are the 
result of collusion. 
There are a number of difficulties with this approach. First, vir-
tually each evidentiary standard is by Posner's own admission incon-
clusive or ambiguous. This is a point already developed at some 
length by others,41 and I will not repeat it here. But within Posner's 
own scheme, the crucial question is what combination of these factors 
would prove a case. On this question Posner offers virtually, no guid-
ance. To be sure, he does suggest that a trier of fact might not be 
persuaded "to disregard the uniform results of twelve different tests 
of collusive behayior."42 This may be so. Indeed, if all twelve tests 
are satisfied, a trier of fact might well conclude simply that explicit 
collusion had occurred, despite denials and lack of direct proof. It 
hardly seems likely that all noncompetitive pricing in highly concen-
trated industries will be in industries characterized by all these ele-
ments. Thus, the analysis rests on the ability of the courts and en-
forcement agencies to draw the right conclusions from some, but not 
all, of the evidence Posner suggests. Perhaps this is possible, but 
it seems more likely that what will result is a voluminous record, a 
great deal of confusion, and a considerable likelihood of error.43 
Consider, for example, that Posner is severely critical of the Court's 
40. See my remarks to the Mid-Winter Symposium, Chicago Bar Association 
Committee on Antitrust Law and Illinois State Bar Association Section on Antitrust 
Law (October 31, 1974), where this approach is briefly described. Cf. Hay & 
Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 13 
(1974). 
41. Professor Richard Markovits has developed this point at great length in a. 
series of articles published in 1974 and 1975. His views on Posner's standards are 
summarized in Markovits, supra note 35. 
42. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 75. 
43. Posner suggests minimization of the likelihood of error by "imposing a higher 
standard of proof on the government in cases where the only evidence of collusion is 
economic." Id. at 75. Given the conceded ambiguity of much of the evidence that 
Posner suggests using, this may appear sensible. But could it not also reduce vir-
tually to zero the likelihood of government success? 
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use of economic evidence in the very American Tobacco case44 he 
relies on heavily for the proposition that section 1 extends to "tacit" 
collusion. 
Second, I do not believe that even with more adequate guidance 
the courts and enforcement agencies can make such standards work-
able. I first considered Posner's basic analysis not as an academic, 
but as an enforcement official. My initial reaction was to throw up 
my hands in despair, for even with a great deal more economic ex-
pertise in the Antitrust Division than in years past I could not imagine 
the Division fashioning such a program. Nor could I imagine a judi-
ciary with the economic sophistication necessary to make such a pro-
gram effective. My views on this have not changed, even though 
Posner's standards seem the picture of simplicity. The practical dif-
ficulties are not simply the result of a lack of economic sophistication, 
for at least in the enforcement agencies such sophistication can and 
should be brought to bear. Nor is the problem confined to the fact 
that economists will disagree over the validity of Posner's tests, thus 
making the standards themselves the subject of continual debate, al-
though this will certainly be the case. And clearly some of the 
necessary data can be gathered quickly. It is not difficult to deter-
mine, for example, if the industry employs a basing-point system, 
or whether market shares are declining. But data concerning 
capacity, demand elasticity, and abnormal profits are exceedingly 
difficult to obtain and even more difficult to evaluate. 
Third, do the tests suggested by Posner actually reflect collective 
monopoly pricing and only such pricing? Is it not possible that a 
firm with significant market power will price at noncompetitive levels 
wholly without regard to the reactions of others, its pricing simply re-
flecting its own position in the markets? Professor Richard Markovits 
has sharply criticized Posner's analysis on this ground, 45 and Posner 
has to a degree recognized the validity of the point. In the present 
book, he recites it only as an objection to the use of price discrimina-
tion as evidence of tacit collusion and responds by noting the care with 
which such evidence must be evaluated. In a direct response to Pro-
fessor Markovits, Posner suggested that to a substantial degree the con-
cern is alleviated if the market is properly defined narrowly, thus 
making the individual power of particular firms clear. He further 
suggested that he would permit the defendant to escape liability 
upon a showing that "its noncompetitive pricing behavior was due 
not to collusion but to the possession of a lawful source of monopoly 
power, such as a patent or copyright, or a very large market share."46 
44. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
45. See Markovits, supra note 35. The critique is more fully developed in a 
lengthy series of articles by Markovits. See id. at 919 n.4. 
46. Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903, supra note 1, at 912-13. 
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Whether Posner continues to adhere to that view is not clear. But 
assuming that he does, it raises both a conceptual difficulty with his 
analysis and a considerable complication for trial. The latter point 
is a practical one; the former is the simple recognition that noncom-
petitive pricing is not solely a product of collusion, "tacit" or explicit, 
and therefore a court may be reluctant to draw the necessary infer-
ence of "tacit collusion" in the first instance. 47 
Thus, the evidentiary problems posed by the Posner proposal are 
sufficiently severe to raise serious questions of workability even 
if the basic assumptions were acceptable. Posner is not oblivious 
of these difficulties, although I believe he understates them. He 
correctly points out, however, that his proposal cannot be judged in 
any absolute sense but only in comparison to the alternatives. And 
any action seeking structural relief utilizing section 2 could well pre-
sent many of the same difficulties, unless the courts are prepared 
to place very heavy weight on market structure alone, as they have 
done with single-firm monopolization cases. In terms solely of com-
plexity, we may have a Robson's choice. The need to develop 
simpler standards of proof and simpler legal rules thus persists.48 
Whatever the proof problems, the ultimate question is one of 
relief. Viewing the problem of persistent noncompetitive pricing as 
one of collusion, Posner would rely on the normal antitrust remedies 
for such behavior. More particularly, the remedy, in his words, 
would be "an injunction, fine, or damage award which allows the 
47. Recognition of this point suggests a basic difference between Posner and a 
number of those favoring a structural approach, for it is precisely the individual 
market power reflected by a large market share that is the latter approach's target. 
To the extent these differences exist, the two approaches suggest a different focus at 
trial with respect to the same evidence. This is not to suggest that Posner is inconsis-
tent. He is simply recognizing that if supracompetitive pricing is clearly not attribut-
able to collusion but has instead resulted from a judgment of the firm without concern 
for rivals' reactions, there has not been any conduct that can be called collusion, at 
least on the part of that firm. But it may seem somewhat anomalous to permit a 
firm to escape liability by showing it has individual market power, the very thing 
about which many are most concerned. 
Posner is careful to note that he is talking about "lawful" monopoly power. In 
the setting of a patent or copyright, few would disagree. But the concept of a "law-
ful" market share is much more ambiguous. Is the "lawfulness" of a large market 
share an issue to be tried in a collusion case? 
Posner would, in addition, argue that single-firm market power ought not be a 
major concern in any event. It will persist only if based on efficiencies, superior 
management, protection granted by the government, or exclusionary practices that 
the law can prohibit directly. Obviously some would not agree. See, e.g., William-
son, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1513-14 (1972). 
48. I have not addressed the use of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as the vehicle for dealing with the adverse 
competitive effects of high concentration, even though that statute's simple prohibi-
tion of "unfair methods of competition" may be viewed as broader in scope than 
either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act, because the economic issues and methods of 
proof ought not differ substantially. 
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defendant complete competitive flexibility, and forbids only the (ex-
plicit or tacit) collusive agreement itself."40 As a purely abstract 
proposition, Posner's remedial position has a certain attractiveness, 
if our sole concern is to assure competitive price and output levels, 
and if we are certain that these levels do not result from the market 
power of individual firms. If some highly concentrated industries 
behave in normal competitive fashion, the law can presumably make 
penalties sufficiently substantial, or enforcement so effective, as to 
induce other firms in other industries to behave similarly. To para-
phrase an old saw, every firm has its price. No decisions of this type 
are so inevitable that another is not possible. There is an analytic 
simplicity to the Posner approach that is attractive. But is it a real 
solution? 
Posner's remedy must be considered both in terms of existing 
law and the new civil penalty he proposes. The deterrents available 
today are the legal rule itself, which some may obey simply because 
it exists, injunctive relief, criminal sanctions, treble damages to in-
jured parties, and divestiture. It is unlikely that a general rule 
against "tacit collusion" will in itself, without regard to sanction, ac-
complish anything. Until the practices in a given industry are 
successfully challenged, the firms within it are unlikely even to be-
lieve that they are colluding. And the firms are likely to engage 
in such conduct anyway, unless the cost is made too high. Criminal 
sanctions seem inappropriate as to individuals, at least if traditional 
standards governing criminal responsibility are applied. In some 
cases, the maximum $1 million corporate criminal fine might be a 
substantial deterrent.50 But to the major firm that coldly calculates on 
a cost-benefit basis, and is influenced to a degree by its likelihood 
of apprehension, $1 million is far too small an amount effectively 
to deter. Nor, I would think, could the government expect to be 
successful in many of these cases if it had to satisfy the criminal "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard. At this time, then, reliance 
would need to be placed on the injunction, divestiture, or treble 
damage actions. 
The injunction envisaged by Posner is the picture of simplicity, 
prohibiting tacit or explicit collusion in general terms, with no refer-
ence to specific types of conduct.51 Professor Turner, considering 
the same remedial question, concluded that such an injunction would 
be hopelessly vague, that an injunction going further and demanding 
49. R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 65. 
50. The maximum corporate firm was increased from $50,000 to $1 million by 
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 
1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)). 
51. While this seems clear from the text, R. PosNER, supra note 3 at 65, it is 
made clearer in Posner's earlier work. See Posner, 21 STAN. L. REV, 1562, supra 
note 1, at 1591 n.1. 
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that the firm make its price and output decisions without regard to. 
rivals' reactions would "demand such irrational behavior that full 
compliance would be virtually impossible,"52 and that the only pro-
hibition with any chance of success would require an equation involv-
ing price and marginal cost. But this latter prohibition embodies a-
form of judicial public-utility-type regulation that would clearly be 
unacceptable. Indeed, the very difficulty of framing injunctive relief 
is one of the keystones of Turner's argument that section 1 ought 
not be applied. Posner and Turner are so far apart on this issue, 
I believe, largely because they view the function of injunctive relief 
differently. Turner adheres to the relatively traditional view that an 
injunction is designed to particularize the application of a statutory 
standard to specific conduct. To Posner, however, an injunction is 
a peg on which to hang a virtually unlimited sanction. The guid-
ance to the businesspersons would come from the evidence on which 
the firms were convicted in the first instance, and their conduct would 
be changed because the sanction would be greater than the gain. 
Violation would presumably be proved by again resorting to economic 
evidence. 
One might debate whether courts are prepared to enter and 
enforce such broad injunctions, with the prospect of violation resting 
perhaps on a repeat of the trial just concluded, or how a firm would 
be able to comply.53 But that misses Posner's main point, which is 
the nature of the sanction. For whether that sanction is by contempt, 
or treble damages, or a wholly new remedy, it is the law's ability 
to make collusion, whatever its form, more costly than noncollusion 
that will change behavior. Contempt simply provides the oppor-
tunity to impose such a sanction. It is hard to believe, however, that 
the threat of contempt, with a wholly discretionary dollar sanction 
to be imposed after another trial based on relatively ambiguous evi-
denGe, 54 will be sufficient to bring a radical change in the price and 
output decision, if for no other reason than the amount is totally un-
known in advance. 
Under present law, the primary financial deterrent is the treble 
damage remedy. But it is unlikely that the threat of treble damages 
52. Turner, supra note 29, at 669. 
53. The firm might simply instruct its employees not to engage in noncompetitive 
pricing. But such an instruction would have little meaning, particularly to em-
ployees who have little sense that they are doing wrong. Any such instruction will 
more likely be directed toward the specific evidence on which liability was estab-
lished, but since some of the factors suggested by Posner are not really controllable 
by a single firm (e.g., declining market shares) they are not readily translatable as 
standards of conduct. 
54. The trial in a contempt action might, depending on the facts, rest on virtually 
the same types of evidence utilized initially. In such a case, many of the most 
complex issues will already have been resolved. On the other hand, noncompetitive 
pricing might persist although the evidence thereof is significantly different. ·Thus 
the contempt· trial is likely to be as complex as the initial trial at which liability was 
established. 
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will be sufficient to induce the firm engaged in "tacit collusion" to 
change its ways and engage in competitive pricing instead. Based 
on proof of actual damage to particular persons, it in no way approxi-
mates a defendant's gain. It will almost necessarily be significantly 
less. True, the actual damage award is trebled, but this is a crude 
way to determine the incentive necessary to alter profitable conduct. 
Moreover, the offending firms can reasonably assume that such cases 
can be settled for a fraction of their gain. And, finally, if the threat 
of treble damages has not been an adequate deterrent to explicit 
price-fixing, and it surely has not, it cannot be expected to deter 
"tacit collusion." 
Thus Posner's solution to "the oligopoly problem," as he defines 
it, is substantially dependent upon enactment of a new remedy, as 
Posner himself recognized in his earlier writings on this subject. 66 
Without it, I do not believe firms are likely to opt away from con-
duct that they can with some reason view as natural. The new 
remedy Posner proposes is a civil damage award based on the social 
costs of the wrongful conduct (the gains to the firm, measured by 
the difference between competitive and noncompetitive price, plus 
the cost resulting from reduced output) multiplied by a factor de-
signed to reflect the likelihood of apprehension. 56 In order to bring 
about the calculated change in conduct Posner believes can occur, the 
remedy must not only in abstract, conceptual terms be sufficient to 
alter the cost-benefit equation, including the risk of being caught-
the actors must also have some idea of its dimension in advance, and 
they must be disabused of the notion that it is negotiable or other-
wise discretionary. Posner confidently asserts that social costs can 
be computed with relative ease and demonstrated through economic 
proofs. But will firms making critical decisions see it this way? And 
what of the other part of the equation, the likelihood of apprehen-
sion? Is it even remotely possible to arrive at such a figure? 
Finally, given the fact that collusion is often the result of the actions 
of lower level officials, can we rely on a corporate punishment alone 
because a corporation has effective methods of preventing its em-
ployees from committing acts that impose huge liabilities on it? In 
conceptual terms this statement is hard to contest, but as a practical 
matter, I am not certain that this is so. Explicit collusion today can 
expose the firm to very large liabilities. Yet such collusion exists, 
often involving employees at low levels acting contrary to corporate 
policy and under threat of discharge for disobedience. Perhaps this 
55. See Posner, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, supra note 1, at 1590-91. 
56. Professors Elzinga-and Breit have also proposed a substantial monetary pen-
alty. After canvassing a number of the elements considered by Posner, they recom-
mend a mandatory penalty of 25 per cent of the firm's pretax profits for every year 
of anticompetitive activity for all violations. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANU-
TRUST PENALTIES 134-35 (1976). 
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is so because they view the likelihood of apprehension differently 
than the firm does, or because they are not convinced the corporate 
policy means what it says. Or do they simply not understand what 
they can and cannot do? If this is the case, how are they to under-
stand that they cannot "tacitly" collude? These are questions to which 
I do not have the answers, but they leave me distinctly uneasy about 
the remedial efficacy_ of Posner's proposal. 
Conspicuously absent from Posner's discussion of relief is any 
reference to restructuring. Yet, when he first proposed the behav-
ioral analysis now central to this book; he stated: 
Moreover, there may be extreme cases where dissolution is the 
appropriate remedy for convicted tacit colluders because repetition of 
the offense is difficult to prevent by other means. Ordinarily the con-
ventional remedies should be adequate, but courts should not shrink 
from employing dissolution in the exceptional case. It is no objection 
that dissolution is addressed to market structure rather than behavior. 
As noted earlier, non-competitive pricing is very much a function of 
the structure of the market; even express collusion is rarely practic-
able in markets that are not oligopolistic in structure. The possibility 
of dissolution should provide an additional deterrent to tacit collu-
sion. 57 
Utilization of a structural remedy would move Posner significantly 
closer to those who perceive the problem to ·be one of structure from 
the outset, even though he arrives there by a considerably different 
route. This is a position in which he apparently no longer wishes 
to be found. Perhaps he was struck by Professor Turner's observa-
tion that to seek structural relief predicated upon a finding of "tacit 
collusion" is "virtually to concede that the finding of liability on the 
ground of conspiracy is dubious at best."58 Or it may be that Posner 
still adheres to his original view, although I think not. In any event, 
if collusion, even explicit collusion, is a persistent condition, and if 
such collusion can be made far more difficult through dissolution, 
is it not both appropriate and more likely to be effective than a 
monetary penalty? 
Structural relief is slow and costly to obtain. Posner devotes 
much of one chapter to a statistical analysis proving the point, and 
I would be the last to disagree. I have said the same thing else-
where. 59 But a comparative judgment is required. Suppose we 
know that dissolution will eliminate collusion, and that a monetary 
penalty might do so. Dissolution is costly, but so is a subsequent 
proceeding in which tacit collusion must be proved all over again. 
In the long run, which cost is greater? 
57. Posner, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, supra note 1, at 1591 (footnote omitted). 
58. Turner, supra note 29, at 671. 
59. See The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1973: Hearings Before Subcomm. 
on Antitrust and Monopoly of Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary on S.1284, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 90, 96 (1975) (prepared statement of Thomas E. Kauper, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
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Structural relief in any antitrust case, whether under section 1 
or section 2 of the Sherman Act, or even section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, 60 raises serious questioI1,s with respect to both benefits and costs. 
On the benefit side, there can never be complete assurance that the 
competitive gains sought will be achieved. This is so for a variety 
of reasons, including the simple fact that we may not be sure how 
many firms are needed to assure competitive performance. The his-
tory of structural relief is not reassuring on this score, as Posner 
demonstrates. On the cost side, structural relief imposes a series 
of transitional costs ranging from attorneys' fees to the costs caused 
by uncertainty in the industry during the transitional period. In 
addition, there is a risk that the firms created may not be as efficient 
as those with which we began. Virtually all proposals for structural 
relief are confined to firms larger than necessary for economies of 
scale and would utilize such relief only if efficient firms can be 
created. 61 Conceptually, at least, efficiency loss can be avoided. 
But as a practical matter, the issue of efficiency loss would be directly 
involved in the litigation and become a matter of proof, proof which 
is likely to be highly 'speculative. This adds complexity and litigation 
costs and suggests some likeJihood of error. But it hardly means 
that efficiency losses will always result, and that the structural 
remedy is always inappropriate. It simply means that it must be 
utilized cautiously and only if other remedies will not suffice. 
In assessing the costs and historical insufficiencies of structural 
relief, consideration must also be given to changes in the present pro-
cedures that might make such relief more effective and less costly. 
One of the clearest faults with the process is its lack of speed, a point 
graphically' made by Posner. Because of the time that commonly 
elapses between the filing of a complaint and the date on which 
divestiture finally occurs, the relief may have little to do with the 
industry as it existed when the complaint was filed. Part of the 
lapsed time, of course, involves trial on the issue of liability. But 
the divestiture process is itself exceedingly slow, both in developing 
the relief plan and. then in carrying it out. My own experience sug-
gests that this is to a substantial degree due to the defendant's tactics. 
Delay may bring profits in the interim. Even significant changes in 
the industry may afford the basis for reargument over relief. And 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate 
acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition." 
61. See Turner, supra note 38, at 1216. The most commonly discussed statutory 
deconcentration proposals also contemplate that structural relief not be utilized to 
reduce a firm's size in such a way as to cause substantial loss of economies of scale. 
This is true of the Concentrated Industries Act proposed by the Neal Task Force in 
1968, as well as the Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973), proposed by Senator Philip Hart. These two proposals are reprinted as 
Appendix C and Appendix B, respectively, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra 
note 1, at 444-52. 
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the passage of time may bring new administrators to the enforcement 
agencies, administrators willing to depart from the decisions of their 
predecessors. There is, in short, little incentive for speed. We 
need to consider alternatives to change these incentives, including, 
perhaps, the kind of financial incentives Posner himself proposes in 
another setting. 62 There is no apparent reason why structural relief 
need be as cumbersome as it is. 
Overall, I believe that Posner's proposed solution to "the oligopoly 
problem" poses a number of serious theoretical and practical difficul-
ties that may be insuperable, and that at least for now it surely cannot 
be characterized as "the" answer. 63 But my comments ought not 
be taken as denigrating the value of Posner's effort, which is a sig-
nificant contribution to the understanding of cartel behavior. More-
over, Posner's proposals cannot and should not be judged in the ab-
stract, for the alternatives commonly proposed are fraught with 
similar difficulties. Monopolization cases are at least equally diffi-
cult in terms of proof, the remedial problems are severe, and the 
use of section 2 to restructure highly concentrated industries remains 
virtually untried. Statutory proposals basing structural relief to a 
significant degree simply on a showing of high concentration will con-
tinue to languish, if for no other reason than the ambiguity of the 
empirical evidence correlating concentration and various aspects of 
industry performance. Yet there is a general feeling that a practical 
solution must be found. This will not happen until there is a greater 
consensus on the nature and scope of the problem to be remedied. 
The courts and enforcement agencies, therefore, continue to find 
themselves attempting to develop a policy without a strong consensus 
over the best course. There is little choice but to experiment and 
to develop a better sense of what is workable on a case-by-case 
basis. 64 Posner's analysis, or some variant thereof, refined through 
62. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 56, at 151. 
63. At an earlier point, Posner put his propo~al in somewhat different terms. 
Having noted that "[m]uch of the economic evidence described above could not yet 
be assimilated by the judicial process," he seemed to suggest use of economic evidence 
by the Antitrust Division primarily in making its enforcement decisions, Posner, 
supra note 22, at 523-24, a suggestion with which I largely agree. Since that time, 
however, the district court in Walls Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 
295 (N.D. Cal. 1971 ), found a § 1 violation based in substantial part on economic 
evidence of the type proposed by Posner. 
64. The government complaints filed in United States v. The Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., Civ. C-73-836 (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 9, 1973), and United States v. 
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civ. C-73-835 (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 9, 1973), 
reflected my disposition to utilize § 2 of the Sherman Act to obtain structural relief 
in a highly concentrated industry but without single firm monopoly. While the cases 
were ultimately dismissed after a reevaluation of the government's efforts, I would 
still view § 2 as an appropriate vehicle in some oligopoly situations. The reasons 
for dismissal of the tire cases are set forth in a Memorandum for the Attorney Gen-
eral dated February 23, 1976, reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,259 
(1976). 
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further reflections, offers one way in which to experiment, as he sug-
gests. At the same time, however, I would certainly not make 
significant changes in the current treatment of explicit price-fixing 
or merger policy in reliance upon it, as Posner apparently would. 
Left totally uncertain by Posner's cartel analysis, and indeed by 
those advocating structural relief, is the quantitative significance of 
conduct that is overtly conspiratorial in setting or maintaining non-
competitive price and output levels in highly concentrated industries. 
Put another way, to what extent is such behavior dependent on actual 
agreement? Admittedly, this is extremely difficult to measure, for 
much of the conduct involved is unlawful and thus not normally dis-
closed voluntarily. But as a practical matter, the answer to this 
question is of considerable importance. If most noncompetitive pric-
ing rests in part on overt collusion, more effective enforcement 
directed toward such acts could eliminate a significant part of the 
oligopoly problem, without costly structural relief or the need for the 
type of analysis called for by Posner. Indeed, enforcement activity 
directed toward express collusion might even deter conduct that Pos-
ner views as "tacit collusion," simply because firms may opt not to 
walk too close to the line. 
I have long believed that much so-called oligopoly pricing 
involves to a significant extent direct communication and agreement. 
Cartels are difficult to form and even more difficult to police, and 
more emphasis is perhaps needed on conduct that can be viewed 
as cartel enforcement. Posner apparently believes much the same 
thing, asserting that in most of these cases there will be explicit, al-
though well-concealed, collusion that can surely be deterred by 
threat of punishment. I found this a rather curious statement. Hav-
ing argued at some length for the use of section 1, in conjunction 
with economic evidence, to reach nonexplicit collusion, Posner then 
seems to advance as justification for his proposal the idea that it will 
be an effective way to deal with explicit collusion. 66 Perhaps so, 
but more explanation of the deficiencies of a direct attack on such 
practices is needed, particularly since Posner calls for significant 
changes in the way these matters are now handled. 
Assuming that explicit collusion or direct communication is com-
monly present when there is noncompetitive pricing, why have we 
not dealt with it adequately on a direct-proof basis? Perhaps we 
have and the initial assumption is simply wrong, but I think not. 
Part of the answer clearly is that concealment is effective, and the 
acts cannot be detected. Investigative techniques can be improved 
but admittedly will never be perfect. In addition, however, I believe 
enforcement in the past has paid too little attention to the kinds of 
activity directed toward policing, as opposed to creating, cartels. 
65. To the extent Posner means that a greatly increased penalty would add an 
effective deterrent to explicit collusion, I would not disagree, 
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Each firm in a cartel will want to cheat, if possible. Thus any 
effective cartel is likely to be characterized by agreement on a wide 
variety of details, ranging from shipping terms to package sizes. 
Price information exchanges may be and are utilized to throw the 
spotlight on those who cheat. Moreover, the law itself may both 
encourage agreement and deter cheating. This, it seems to me, is 
one of the consequences of the Robinson-Patman Act,66 which 
encourages firms to check prices with each other for purposes of the 
"meeting competition" defense and discourages secret price discount-
ing in the first place. 67 
There is more, then, that can a:nd should be done simply in deal-
ing with explicit collusion, particularly where there is little consensus 
on other courses of action. A number of Posner's proposals are use-
ful in implementing such a program, even without reference to tacit 
collusion. This is particularly true of his use of economic data to 
select collusion-prone industries, a program already to a degree being 
utilized. I found his analysis of price exchange agreements particu-
larly valuable, even outside the setting of his broader proposals. 
Posner is sharply critical of the "criminalization" of tp.e per se 
rule against price-fixing and of what he calls the current "cops and 
robbers" approach. He would replace the criminal sanction with the 
new civil penalty discussed above. It is not clear whether he is sug-
gesting that the criminal sanction be dropped now, before any new 
remedy is enacted. If he is, I would urge the contrary, for I firmly 
believe that the threat of a jail sentence is the strongest deterrent 
available under present law, even though jail sentences have in the 
past been woefully inadequate. 68 But I think we part company on 
a more basic point. Posner proposes continued use of the per se 
rule against price-fixing where explicit collusion is found in an 
industry that according to his economic standards is collusion-prone. 
He further encourages some continuing enforcement to prevent 
conspiratorial activities in other industries but also suggests that, as 
they are not likely actually to establish noncompetitive price levels, 
they should be punished as attempts, with a lesser sanction. Perhaps 
I misinterpret him, but it appears Posner is urging that a variety of 
economic factors be considered at trial even where actual conspir-
atorial activity is found. If so, I find this a- disheartening step back-
wards in the direction of the old rule of reason approach. 
The primary reasons offered for this suggestion are that the 
emphasis on "attempts" has distracted the courts and agencies from 
66. 15 u.s.c. § 13 (1970). 
61. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 11 61,238 
(3d Cir. 1977); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 37-63 
(1976). 
68. A table reflecting jail sentences imposed from 1890 through 1974 is set out 
in the text. R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 33. 
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focusing on an economic approach and that resources are thereby 
being wasted on cases with no economic impact. The former is an 
historical argument and certainly need not be true in the future. 
The second argument is the stronger so far as future policy is con-
cerned. Indeed, if Posner is simply suggesting the use of economic 
data in resource-planning decisions, I am in substantial agreement. 
But I see no reason, in terms of resource use, for requiring proof 
of economic effects or proof that an industry is collusion-prone at 
trial. The resources expended in developing such proof and in 
analyzing it at trial, even assuming this could be done, would be con-
siderable. If the fact of collusion is already known, why should they 
be expended? Moreover, the need for a precise rule to serve as 
an effective deterrent militates strongly against conditioning it in any 
way. And finally, Posner gives insufficient weight to the fact that 
prosecution itself may deter others by creating the belief that there 
is a higher likelihood of apprehension than they might otherwise 
think. 
Posner's "tacit collusion" analysis leads him also to suggest that 
significant changes be made in the law as it now applies to horizon-
tal mergers. Our apprehension about such mergers, at least insofar 
as it is rooted in economic concerns, rests substantially in the per-
ceived inadequacy of tools to stop anticompetitive behavior once 
firms have merged. In this sense, the merger rules are prophylactic. 
Posner suggests that had the law developed to deal effectively with 
"tacit collusion," the only antimerger policy we would need would be 
directed toward mergers creating a single firm having monopoly 
power. He does not seriously propose such a policy, however, recog-
nizing that the law will not so develop and that penalties not yet en-
acted will not successfully deter monopoly pricing. Whether the 
concern is simply with structural relief (by virtue of economic conse-
quences necessarily attributable to it) or with the fact that concentra-. 
tion facilitates collusion, a merger policy_ directed toward prevention 
of significant gains in concentration remains necessary. Even if 
there are significant gaps in our economic knowledge concerning 
oligopoly pricing, we know enough to justify a relatively severe pro-
hibition on mergers between direct competitors. This question is 
primarily one of degree. 
Formulation of horizontal merger rules predicated upon the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court has been particularly difficult, for in its 
merger decisions the Court has both failed to develop a single con-
sistent rationale and has given considerable weight to factors at vari-
ance from those related to considerations of economic efficiency.00 
The merger decisions of the 1960s are not difficult to criticize, par-
ticularly if they are to be measured against an efficiency criterion, 
and Posner does it well. Indeed, even the Department of Justice 
69. See Kauper, supra note 7, at 333, 338-40. 
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Merger Guidelines70 do not extend as far as the Court's decisions 
would permit. 
Posner proposes that horizontal mergers be presumed unlawful 
only if the merger creates a market with a four-firm concentration 
ratio of at least sixty per cent, or if the merger significantly increases 
concentration in a market predisposed to collusion. In most cases, 
the latter standard would· involve markets already highly concen-
trated. This is itself a considerable loosening of existing standards. 
But of eve1:1 greater consequence is Posner's definition of the rele-
vant market, which would include more substitute products and 
larger geographic areas than does the present market definition for 
section 7 cases. The consequence, of course, is the reduction of the 
relevant market shares. 
These proposals, like most of the rest of Posner's analysis, are 
both provocative and controversial. I offer here only several tenta-
tive coments. First, it does not seem to me that the reformulation 
of merger policy need to be predicated upon resolution of the dif-
ferences between Posner's analysis and that of the structuralists. 
Both assume that there are significant dangers from concentration, 
and there is already as much disagreement over where the danger 
level arises among those emphasizing concentration alone as will be 
added by the Posner analysis. A policy predicated on the economic 
dangers of concentration would itself be a significant change, and 
the divergent explanations of . those dangers may not be of great 
consequence. 
Second, it is not clear to me that we understand the dynamics 
of concentration well enough .to set levels as high as Posner does. 
Even if the concern is collusion, the size or peculiar characteristics 
of particular firms may be significant. For example, suppose the in-
dustry is comprised of one firm with forty per cent of the market 
and ten firms with six per cent each. Might not the danger of non-
competitive pricing be greater than if the top four firms had fifteen 
per cent each? I do not think we really know the answer. 
Third, Posner's standards appear to ignore mergers that may in-
crease the individual market power of firms, even though he appears 
to recognize that noncompetitive pricing may in some circumstances 
result. This is fully consistent with his initial assertion that the con-
cern of antitrust is collusive pricing and restriction of output, but it 
is also a point on which there will be sharp disagreement. Certainly 
there is a case to be made for prohibiting mergers that enhance a 
firm's individual market power without regard to likelihood of collu-
sion, if noncompetitive pricing is the probable result. 
Finally, it seems to me that the most fundamental disagreement 
10. See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 
,r 4510 (1977). 
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is over the identification of harms caused by a strict policy against 
horizontal mergers. If such mergers could be prohibited without 
causing substantial harm, there would be far less reluctance to do 
so. But some horizontal mergers are beneficial. In some cases, 
economies of scale may be more quickly achieved. In addition, we 
must not unduly impair the ability to sell on-going businesses. The 
most fundamental difference between Posner and a number of 
others on merger policy, it seems to me, is over the level at which 
economies are achieved and, indeed, over the economies about 
which we ought to be concerned. 71 I tend to believe that Posner 
over-emphasizes the point, but others will disagree. 
It cannot be doubted that the law with respect to mergers has 
in the past been in some disarray. The interjection of social con-
cerns has been a major cause of the confusion. But even though 
the Court seems to be shifting more clearly toward economic criteria, 
a significant step forward in itself, a quantum leap of the type pro-
posed by Posner seems both too much to expect and more than is 
warranted. I would prefer to err on the side of caution, and caution 
in this instance means a more severe posture toward horizontal mer-
gers than Posner proposes. 
III. EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES, ANTITRUST REMEDIES, 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
I have devoted a major part of this review to Posner's treatment 
of collusion, both because it is perhaps the most provocative and con-
troversial theme in the book and because he himself has given it such 
a central role. In one sense, I find it unfortunate that he did so, 
not because it is unimportant or lacks useful insight, but because it 
seems to me the collusion analysis is given more of a load than it 
needs to bear and, perhaps, more than it can. Even those who are 
prepared to accept Posner's ultimate goal for antitrust policy, and are 
thus likely to urge reform, may well find the section 1 analysis unac-
ceptable. And some may not be prepared to make dramatic changes 
in such areas as merger policy or the rules with respect to informa-
tion exchanges based on such speculation. If all that Posner has 
to say is totally dependent on the collusion approach, then final judg-
ment should perhaps rest upon it alone. But there are valuable in-
sights and proposals in this book that should be evaluated independ-
ent of his cartel analysis. 
Posner has a great deal that is worthwhile to say on most of the 
major subjects of antitrust enforcement. I found his chapter entitled 
"Exclusionary Practices, Real and Imagined," particularly incisive. 
In a relatively few pages, Posner covers tying arrangements, preda-
tory pricing, vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and boycotts. 
71. This issue is discussed in a variety of ways by the papers contained in part 2 
of INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 1. 
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Unlike some, Posner is prepared to recognize that some conduct is 
truly exclusionary and should be prohibited. But if economic effici-
ency is to be our guide, the legal rules should be ~onsiderably re-
shaped. His analysis of tie-ins and vertical integration is to a consid-
erable degree a repetition of the work of others, as I have already 
noted, although the tie-in analysis breaks new ground by formulating 
a policy directly aimed at the proposition that tie-ins should be 
viewed as a form of price discrimination. The very brief section on 
boycotts begins with the simple observation that a boycott is a means, 
not an end, and should be treated by the law as such. Traditionally, 
however, we have condemned the means without regard to what the 
parties accomplished, or sought to accomplish. Why this has been 
so is not altogether clear. If parties sign a contract, the legality of 
the contract in antitrust terms does not rest on the simple fact the 
Sherman Act applies to contracts but is determined by examining 
what the contract is intended to do. Yet if the means can be called 
a boycott, the conduct is likely to be condemned for that reason 
alone. But is "conspiracy" really that different from "contract"? 
Posner clearly thinks not and proposes that boycotts be condemned 
only if used to enforce an otherwise anticompetitive practice. 
The most intriguing portion of the exclusionary practices chapter 
deals with predatory pricing. This is a subject of considerable cur-
rent interest, in part because of the recent publication of an influen-
tial study by Professor Donald Turner and Professor Philip Areeda, 72 
and also because reform or repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act is 
again the subject of intense debate. 73 Posner is not prepared to dis-
miss predatory pricing as irrational economic behavior that will not 
occur, although he would not expect it to occur frequently. He ex-
pressly disagrees with Turner and Areeda, who would confine legal 
prohibition to sales below short-run marginal costs. Posner would 
include within the prohibition sales below long-run marginal cost 
with intent to exclude a competitor. Both analyses must be read 
together. Both are important. 
In a final chapter, written for this book, Posner deals with a 
number of enforcement issues. I hope he will return to this subject, 
because I have the feeling this chapter is something of an after-
thought. While ideas elsewhere are carefully worked out and posi-
tions strongly taken, in this chapter much is not spelled out in detail, 
with the exception of the pena,lty proposals discussed earlier. 
Posner suggests a different trial process, calling for trial on an agreed-
upon narrative, with documents and testimony to be received only 
72. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
73. See U.S. DEPT. OF JusrrcE, supra note 67, which suggests several alternative 
reforms, 
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upon issues as to which the parties cannot agree. Big antitrust cases 
do indeed at least border on the unmanageable, and some reform 
is clearly necessary ( although I am not sure that the problem is con-
fined to antitrust cases and that procedural reform should be so con-
fined). Posner's proposed solution is not new, but his suggestions for 
incentives to induce parties to reach agreement are. They need more 
consideration, however, both in antitrust terms and in the context of 
the litigation process as a whole, than ~osner gives them here. Pro-
posals for reform of the process must also deal more specifically with 
the question of legal standards, for the most unmanageable cases 
tend to be the very cases where those standards are uncertain at best. 
Viewed only in process terms, the worst cases are the very kinds of 
cases Posner elsewhere proposes, the cases in which the court is 
called upon to make a far-ranging inquiry into behavior and eco-
nomic effects. 
Finally, I cannot refrain from comment on Posner's treatment of 
the enforcement agencies and the continuing need for private en-
forcement actions. There is considerable unhappiness with the 
private treble damage remedy, and some have proposed that it be 
abolished, thus leaving enforcement to public agencies. 74 Posner 
turns this question around and asks whether, given the availability 
of private remedies, there is a need for public enforcement ( assum-
ing for the moment that the features of the new penalty he pro-
poses could be worked into private damage measurement). And 
he expresses considerable doubt on the ultimate need for public en-
forcement, although he concludes that for the moment it must 
remain. While recognizing the excesses of private actions, he be-
lieves excesses can be curbed by assessing costs against unsuccessful 
plaintiffs and by confining such actions to actual, as opposed to treble, 
damages in cases where the conduct involved is not concealed. 
Posner's willingness to place heavy, and indeed increasing, reli-
ance on private remedies is consistent with his concepts of free 
markets and allocative efficiency. It is dependent, I believe, on his 
belief that structural relief is generally inappropriate. He also as-
serts that private actions have made a significant contribution to the 
development of the law, and I do not disagree. But in my judgment 
he gives insufficient weight to the most obvious consequence of pri-
vate actions, the virtual transfer of the public policymaking ·role to 
the judiciary. Perhaps that is as he wants it. But that seems to me 
the most disturbing feature of the dramatic rise in private enforce-
ment activity, not simply because I believe the government must 
have a significant role in shaping antitrust policy as such, but because 
it tends to isolate antitrust policy from other economic policy deci-
sionmaking of which it is logically a part. 
14. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 56, at 139-48. 
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Posn·er's view on the merit of private enforcement also rests in 
part on his skepticism about the quality of public enforcement: 
The initiative in the [Antitrust Division] lies with the trial 
lawyers-along with the execution, the theorizing, the design of reme-
dies, and virtually every other aspect of the enforcement process. 
Trial lawyers tend to be combative rather than reflective, and the 
division's trial lawyers, because they are relatively poorly paid, tend 
to be young or mediocre, or to be zealots. They are not the right 
people to be the custodians of the government's antitrust policy, but 
that is what they are. 75 
He further suggests that for a variety of ·reasons the trial staffs are 
not and cannot be effectively controlled, and that there is little incen-
tive to do so. There is some truth in each of these statements, but 
only some. 
Trial attorneys with the government are not ·well paid. Physical 
working conditions are poor. Particularly able trial lawyers do tend 
to be promoted to supervisory positions. Some trial attorneys are 
young, and some probably can be called mediocre. But Posner has 
generalized to a wholly unacceptable degree. Most are competent, 
. able people. Some may be called zealots, and others not. But 
zealotry, in my understanding, means given to zeal, and that is not 
always a quality to be faulted. On occasion, initiatives do rest with 
the trial staffs. But Posner does not discuss the role of economists 
in the Division, a role that has been greatly expanded in recent years. 
Supervision is not as effective as it should be, and mistakes are in-
deed made. But the implication that supervisors cannot or do not 
control the activity of the Division is again simply not so. In my 
own experience, the greatest difficulty is not getting the staff to ex-
ercise self-restraint but to act affirmatively, a problem common to 
virtually all bureaucracies. On balance, I firmly believe that the 
quality of governmental decisionmaking, and of judicial decisions in 
government cases, is significantly better than in private actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
That this book is a valuable contribution to the literature of anti-
trust is clear. It is stimulating and provocative. And yet as a 
blueprint for reform, I find it falls short. It remains, in my mind, 
an imposing edifice to be admired for its symmetry and grace, but 
existing to a substantial degree outside the social consciousness. 
Much of what Posner says remains too conceptual, and thus seems 
too unrealistic, to provide the basis for the sweeping reform he seeks, 
although some of the insights in the book should and will find their 
way into doctrine over a long period of time. 
Part of the sense of unreality I feel on completing the book is 
75. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 231. 
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simply attributable to its failure to explain adequately how doctrine 
arrived at its present form. Part may be attributable to the very fact 
that it is substantially a collection of previously published articles, a 
fact that may cause some concepts to receive particularly heavy em-
phasis and others to receive little, based primarily on the topics 
initially selected by Posner for separate treatment. The book Posner 
might have written would perhaps satisfy on these points. But the 
feeling of unreality is also on:e of substance. The economic analysis, 
while lucidly presented, reflects neither a theoretical nor an empiri-
cal consensus. Too many others have labored too long to be dis-
missed quite as abruptly as they are here. I am simply not satisfied 
that, in an economy that seems more characterized by risk-sharing 
than risk-taking, capital markets work as freely, or entry is as easy, 
as Posner suggests. · But more important, Posner seems to me too 
preoccupied with attacking structural relief, both as it has been 
utilized in the past and as part of numerous legislative proposals. 
His "tacit collusion" analysis and new civil penalty procedure are 
compared with structural relief as it has existed in the past. But 
in terms of realistic choices, the comparison should be made only 
after similar consideration is given to improvement in the process for 
obtaining structural relief, a task Posner does not undertake. And 
the "tacit collusion" argument, which has a number of practical and 
conceptuai difficulties, simply has to bear too much of a load. As 
a result, it seems both unrealistic and unconvincing. 
Posner concludes with the statement that it is time to rethink 
antitrust in economic terms, and that "{t]his book is offered as a 
contribution to the process of rethinking."76 That it surely is, and 
how much more only time will tell. 
76. Id. at 236. 
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